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I. INTRODUCTION
How much are people the products of their parents’ genes, how much
are they the products of their upbringings, and how much do they owe
their successes and failures in life to their own efforts? These are
notoriously, almost comically, unanswerable questions. But scarcely
anyone doubts that nature and nurture—or at a minimum, nature or
nurture—greatly affect who we are and what happens to us in life. And
plainly, people are not morally responsible for their genes, nor—on the
whole—for their upbringings. “Choose your parents wisely” is a wry
but obvious truth.
One’s parents’ fate is not necessarily one’s own, of course. Education
has traditionally been a means to social mobility. The phrase “careers
open to talent” was a byword of the Enlightenment struggle against
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hereditary privilege. Today, although less securely than in the recent
past, education opens the way to careers. There is a strong correlation
between education, earnings, and social status: the lifetime earnings of
college graduates in the United States, on average, are nearly double
those of high school graduates.1 But heredity matters, in education as in
other spheres of life. “Native intelligence” presumably has some part in
educational success. Upbringing surely has as well. Although there are
no guarantees of scholastic success for those whose parents are well
educated, well connected, and well off, they start with obvious educational
advantages. Scores on college admission tests go up, on average, with
parental income, and college students, especially at prestigious universities,
are disproportionately the children of financially comfortable families.2
Affirmative action in higher education on the basis of social class
might therefore seem an attractive way to counteract, and at least
partially to balance, the unearned caprices of birth. Barack Obama, as
his campaign for the presidency got under way in 2007, implied that he
might support affirmative action on the basis of class rather than on the
basis of race. Asked whether his own daughters should benefit from
affirmative action, Obama said they “should probably be treated by any
admissions officer as folks who are pretty advantaged.”3 But as for
social class, “I think that we should take into account white kids who

1. See SARAH R. CRISSEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN
UNITED STATES: 2007, at 1, 10 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2009pubs/p20-560.pdf; see also John E. Morton & Ianna Kachoris, Foreword to RON
HASKINS ET AL., ECON. MOBILITY PROJECT, PROMOTING ECONOMIC MOBILITY BY
INCREASING POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION 3, 4 (2009), available at http:/www.pewtrusts.
org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/PEW_EM_Haskins%
207.pdf (discussing the impact of postsecondary education on economic mobility);
Robert M. Hauser et al., Occupational Status, Education, and Social Mobility in the
Meritocracy 1–2 (Ctr. for Demography & Ecology, Univ. of Wis.-Madison, CDE
Working Paper No. 96-18), available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/cde/cdewp/96-18.pdf
(suggesting that educational attainment corresponds to socioeconomic status). But
cf. GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS, THE HIGHER EDUCATION BUBBLE (2012) (marshaling
evidence that many graduates’ employment prospects are sinking as their educational debt
soars).
2. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., THE SOURCE OF THE RIVER: THE SOCIAL
ORIGINS OF FRESHMEN AT AMERICA’S SELECTIVE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 38–45
(2003) (discussing how children of higher-income families disproportionately attend the
more selective colleges and universities); THE COLL. BD., 2010 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS:
TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 4 (2010) (illustrating that college board scores correlate with
parental income), available at http://professionals.collegeboard.com/prof.download/2010total-group-profile-report-cbs.pdf; Catherine Rampell, SAT Scores and Family Income,
ECONOMIX (Aug. 27, 2009, 1:01 PM), http:/economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/
sat-scores-and-family-income/.
3. A Chronicle Q&A with Barack Obama, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC.
(Nov. 12, 2007), http://chronicle.com/article/A-Chronicle-Q-A-with-Barack/42970/.
THE
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have been disadvantaged and have grown up in poverty and shown
themselves to have what it takes to succeed.”4
Senator Obama put the suggestion in terms that few could disagree
with. But systematic affirmative action on the basis of social class
would almost certainly mean more than seeking out college applicants
from lower-class families or offering more “need-based” scholarships. It
would mean more than informally making allowances for a promising
applicant where there is genuine reason to think that a test score or other
qualification understates the applicant’s ability. As with racial affirmative
action, such measures would arouse little if any controversy. But
realistically, class-based affirmative action would almost certainly
mean systematic admissions preferences based on class, comparable to
affirmative action as it now exists on many campuses on the basis of
race: a program for admitting lower-class students with lesser academic
qualifications over other applicants with higher qualifications.5 Prominent
authors have advocated such preferential programs, and several universities
and colleges, including various divisions of the University of California,
have instituted such class-based affirmative action in their undergraduate
and graduate admissions.6
Class-based preferences are often suggested as a better or more
acceptable alternative to conventional affirmative action on the basis of
race, ethnicity, or sex.7 After all, if affirmative action is meant to help
the underprivileged, surely it is more straightforward to offer preferences
to the underprivileged, rather than to racial groups whose members are
not all underprivileged, while many underprivileged people are not
members of such groups. Class preferences may be especially attractive
4. Eugene Robinson, Obama Cools on Affirmative Action, TRUTHDIG (May 15, 2007),
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20070515_obama_cools_on_affirmative_action/.
5. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6. See generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996) (arguing for a shift from race-based to class-based
affirmative action); Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status,
Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, in AMERICA’S UNTAPPED RESOURCE:
LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 101 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004)
(advocating the expansion of affirmative action programs to include class-based
preferences).
7. See, e.g., Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U.
L. REV. 631, 633 (2011) (“Policies implemented by both law schools and undergraduate
colleges have shown that class-based preferences are feasible and effective in creating
diversity, and they involve much smaller academic costs than do racial preferences.”).
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to affirmative-action-minded colleges and universities in states where—
as a result of statewide referenda or otherwise—it is illegal for public
bodies to discriminate, or to prefer, on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex.8
Measures like California’s Proposition 209 undoubtedly permit preferential
treatment based on social class, so long as it is not simply a disguise for
preference based on race, ethnicity, or sex.9
But there are good reasons to think twice about class-based affirmative
action. Some of the problems with class preference are common to any
educational preference based on group membership rather than educational
qualifications. But some of the most important reasons for caution are
specific to preferences based on social class.
Comparing class preferences with racial preferences helps to point up
some of the reasons for the allure of class preferences but also points up
some of the problems. A crucial consideration is the question of who is
to receive class preference. For example, what about immigrants and
their children? In general, social class is difficult to define, and this very
difficulty would confer great discretion and power on faculties and
academic administrators who undertake to bestow class preferences:
discretion that would be open to abuse for political, ideological, and other
ends. Finally, there is the question of whether preferential treatment is
necessary to increase educational opportunities for the less privileged or
whether the call for class preferences reflects a mindset inimical to
impartial standards and prone to preferences as a first rather than a last
resort.

8. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) (prohibiting the state from discriminating
against or granting preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis of race,
sex, or national origin in the operation of public education, employment, or contracting);
see also MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26 (banning racial preferences in all state public schools),
invalidated by Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701
F.3d 466, 491 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013) (mem.); NEB . C ONST . art. 1, § 30 (banning
discrimination based on race in public employment, contracting, and education); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2008) (banning discrimination based on race in public
employment, education, and contracting); Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov. 9, 1999),
available at http://www.dms.myflorida.com/media/general_counsel_files/one_floridaexecutive
_order_pdf (banning race-based and sex-based preferences in public employment,
education, and contracting).
9. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. For the text of Proposition 209 before it was passed
in 1996, see CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION, November 5, 1996, at
30–33, available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1996g.pdf.
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II. CLASS VERSUS RACE
Racial quotas and preferences, especially in higher education, have
serious drawbacks, as even their supporters often acknowledge. The
case against racial affirmative action is familiar. Racial preferences
enhance race consciousness in a country—and world—in which racism
has already done incalculable mischief.10 They systematically mismatch
minority students with institutions where their qualifications are
significantly below average, hence maximizing these students’ selfdoubts and the likelihood that they will fail or perform poorly.11 They
stigmatize minority students and graduates as recipients of unearned
favor.12 They promote racial self-segregation, through the reluctance of
minority students to expose themselves to embarrassment by their
academically better-prepared fellows.13 They diminish incentives, or
create perverse incentives, by conveying to minority young people
that they need not strive too hard to learn and to achieve.14 They weaken
academic standards because preferences ensure that minority students
have lower qualifications on average, and faculties may be loath to maintain
high standards at the price of conspicuous minority failure.15 They may
also encourage nihilism about the very idea of high academic standards.16
And they are widely felt to be unfair, both because educational institutions
are generally expected to judge by educational criteria, not by racial ones,17
and because many of the beneficiaries of racial preferences are children
of comfortable families, whereas many who are passed over despite their
stronger academic achievements are themselves the children of less
comfortable homes.18
Affirmative action based on social class would at least have the virtue
of not being based on race. Racial animosity, which racial affirmative
10. See Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, Grutter or Otherwise: Racial
Preferences and Higher Education, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 3, 10–11 (2004).
11. Id. at 8–10; see generally RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH:
HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY
UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT (2012) (arguing that affirmative action admissions negatively
affect the students they are intended to benefit).
12. Alexander & Schwarzschild, supra note 10, at 10.
13. Id. at 10–11.
14. Id. at 9–10.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Id.
18. KAHLENBERG, supra note 6, at 42–52.
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action might be thought to aggravate, holds particular social and political
dangers, a fact that is borne out by the history of racial conflict in America
and in many other countries. And many of the drawbacks of racial
affirmative action are enhanced by the conspicuous visibility of people’s
race. The stigma of having received preferential treatment is greatly
enhanced if it is obvious at a glance. Even a minority student admitted
on the merits, without any preference, might be assumed by others to
have received preference and will know that others are making this
assumption. For the same reason, the stigma of racial preference may
persist throughout a person’s professional life. And segregation, including
self-segregation, is facilitated by obvious physical distinctions.
Beneficiaries of class preferences would not stand out in the same
way: it would not be so obvious that a particular student might have
received class preference. Hence, there would not be the same stigma in
one’s student years or beyond. Moreover, affirmative action based on
social class—rather than race—might be less corrosive of academic
standards, at least if faculties and administrators are less prone to dilute
standards in order to disguise the failure or poor performance of those
receiving class preference. After all, students preferred by social class
rather than by race would be less conspicuous and cohesive. And if they
were to succeed less well than their academically better-prepared
fellows, at least it would not appear to replicate the painful American
history of racial discrimination, with the scarcely tolerable spectacle of
such a racial group being once again at the bottom.
Class preferences would also have the virtue of preferring the less
privileged. Racial affirmative action, by contrast, often means preferential
treatment for the children of middle class, or even wealthy and prominent,
minority families. This is especially true given the minority “applicant
pool” at elite colleges, universities, and professional schools: that is, given
that the minority applicants with the strongest academic qualifications—
although they still might not be admitted without preferential treatment—
are often children of prosperous homes.19 If colleges and universities
can satisfy today’s racial affirmative action “goals” by admitting minority
applicants with the best academic qualifications, even if these are the
most prosperous minority applicants, then the institutions are likely to do
so, just as there is an obvious incentive to admit minority applicants who
can afford to pay high tuition rates. Insofar as affirmative action is

19.
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meant to help the less privileged, class preferences would surely be a
more direct and a more consistent way of achieving it.20
On the other hand, the moral urgency of class preference is far less
clear than for racial affirmative action. The legacy of slavery and the
history of racial segregation and discrimination in America are known to
everyone; they are rightly sources of national shame and regret. Today
there is broad national consensus for racial equality, for “equal justice
under law,” and for the moral claims of the civil rights movement: hence
the stature of Martin Luther King Jr. as a national hero. There is also a
widely shared belief that racial stratification, with dramatically better or
worse conditions of life depending on race, is dangerous for society,
sowing the seeds of racial conflict. Whether preferential affirmative
action is a just way toward racial equality and integration, or even whether
it leads to these goals at all, is controversial. But as recompense for
undeniable racial injustice and as a means to racial integration, the case
for affirmative action is on its strongest ground.
As to class, by contrast, there is reason to feel that America has less to
atone for, and possibly less to worry about for the future, than where
race is concerned. Unlike many European countries, the United States
has no hereditary aristocracy. Historically, class distinctions have been
fewer and less rigid in America. Instead, America has been known,
sometimes even disparaged, for its emphasis on upward mobility and its
cult of success. This is not to suggest that America has ever been a
“classless society.” Such a thing may not exist in nature. But America
has been more a land of opportunity than most, a chosen destination for
immigrants throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Has
social mobility now slowed in America? Are there fewer opportunities
today for those who start life without hereditary advantages? These are
controversial questions that may be impossible to answer conclusively.
There are academic studies—and widespread media reports—suggesting
that relative mobility has diminished in America in recent years or
decades: that there is less mobility than in the past between lower, middle,
and upper income ranges.21 Unsurprisingly, there is also criticism of the
20. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 6, at 42–52 (providing extensive documentation
that those granted preferences under racial affirmative action are often from more prosperous
families than those who receive no preference).
21. For scholarly studies, see Greg J. Duncan et al., W(h)ither the Middle Class?
A Dynamic View, in POVERTY AND PROSPERITY IN THE USA IN THE LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 240, 240–71 (Dimitri B. Papadimitriou & Edward N. Wolff eds., 1993). For
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statistical methods, and even of the tacit biases, of these studies and
some evidence that even relative class mobility has not grown or shrunk,
or at least not very much, over recent decades.22 There is less controversy
that absolute incomes have continued to rise on average in recent decades,
at least until the most recent economic downturn. The rich may have
gotten richer, as they proverbially do, but the poor have gotten richer too,
albeit at a lesser rate than the rich. Historically, when the rich get richer
more slowly, the poor often do not get richer at all. In short, there has
been considerable—if far from perfect—class mobility in America in the
past, and there is considerable economic and social opportunity in America
today, with standards of living that at least until very recently have continued
to rise on average.23
The rates of legal and illegal immigration to the United States and the
eagerness with which many more seek to come also suggest that there is
no present crisis of social opportunity in America, at least assuming that
the present economic downturn is temporary.24 Impressive numbers of
people have “voted with their feet” that they can achieve a better life for
themselves and their children in the United States despite arriving with
few hereditary advantages of wealth, status, or position.25
If the moral and social urgency of class affirmative action seems less
pressing than for race, the costs and dangers of class preferences, although
perhaps less obvious than for racial preferences, are still considerable
and for some of the same reasons.

news media reports, see Janny Scott & David Leonhardt, Class in America: Shadowy
Lines That Still Divide, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, at 1, and Meritocracy in America:
Ever Higher Society, Ever Harder To Ascend, ECONOMIST, Jan. 1, 2005, at 22.
22. See Chul-In Lee & Gary Solon, Trends in Intergenerational Income Mobility,
91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 766, 766–72 (2009) (providing statistical analysis suggesting
little change in intergenerational social mobility in recent decades); Bruce Bartlett, Class
Struggle in America?, 120 COMMENT., July–Aug. 2005, at 33, 33–38 (criticizing the New
York Times series, Scott & Leonhardt, supra note 21); Daniel P. McMurrer & Isabel V.
Sawhill, Economic Mobility in the United States, URB. INST. (Oct. 1, 1996), http://www.urban.
org/publications/406722.html (concluding that there is little evidence that mobility has
changed substantially over time).
23. See generally JOINT ECON. COMM., 102D CONG., INCOME MOBILITY AND THE
U.S. ECONOMY: OPEN SOCIETY OR CASTE SYSTEM? (Comm. Print 1992) (written by
Christopher Frenze & Ed Gillespie) (demonstrating income mobility in the U.S. economy);
STEPHEN J. ROSE & SCOTT WINSHIP, ECON. MOBILITY PROJECT, UPS AND DOWNS: DOES
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY STILL PROMOTE UPWARD MOBILITY? (2009) (suggesting that
the American economy promotes upward economic mobility just as it did in the past).
24. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2011
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 5 tbl.1 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2011/ois_yb_2011.pdf.
25. See id.
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Racial conflict may be socially incendiary in any country unlucky
enough to have it, but class conflict is scarcely less so. In various
countries that have experimented with class preferences in education,
these preferences have not only reflected but also aggravated class
division and animosity. Perhaps the least edifying examples of class
affirmative action in the twentieth century were in the USSR and in
China under Mao Tse-tung. Universities were required to favor applicants
with “good”—worker or peasant—class backgrounds and to disfavor or
exclude applicants with “bad” class origins. These policies contributed
to the thorough politicization of communist universities and to sharply
declining academic and intellectual standards. In China during Mao’s
Cultural Revolution, there was wholesale persecution of “bad classes,”
and sons and daughters of alleged “landlords” were beaten to death on
campuses.26 Even before the Cultural Revolution, class was pervasive in
selecting and indoctrinating students in China, at great cost to any
possible academic integrity.27 In Stalin’s Soviet Union, not only were
workers’ children given preferential acceptance at institutes of higher
education, but camp guards in the gulags who volunteered to work in
especially undesirable concentration camps were offered the chance to
have their children reclassified as “children of workers” for this purpose.28
India is another discouraging example. For many decades, India has
had extensive preferences for lower-caste applicants in higher education,
as well as for various government jobs and benefits.29 Caste in India is
not quite the same, of course, as class in other countries. Caste is rigidly
hereditary; traditionally it reflected and determined one’s occupation and
social status.30 Upper castes also tend to be lighter-skinned and more
Aryan, so there is something of a racial aspect too. Perhaps it is fairest
to think of caste as being somewhere on a spectrum between race and
class. In any event, caste affirmative action in India has been incendiary
in the most literal sense: there have been cases of disfavored upper-caste
26. ANNE F. THURSTON, ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE 287 (1987).
27. See generally René Goldman, The Rectification Campaign at Peking University:
May–June 1957, 12 CHINA Q. 138 (1962) (discussing political repression at universities
in Communist China prior to the Cultural Revolution).
28. ANNE APPLEBAUM, GULAG: A HISTORY 264 (2003) (quoting DAVID J. NORDLANDER,
CAPITAL OF THE GULAG 183 (1997)).
29. THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY 31–32 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Frank de Zwart, The Logic of Affirmative Action: Caste, Class and
Quotas in India, 43 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 235, 236 (2000).
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university applicants publicly burning themselves to death in protest.31
Caste preferences are widely acknowledged to have contributed to sharply
declining academic standards, as well as to reinforcing caste enmity,
which erupts in frequent and deadly riots, sometimes verging on caste
warfare, in various parts of India.32
The United States is not India or China, to be sure. But there is little
reason to think that class preferences in the United States would not
promote class animosities, just as Indian caste preferences do and just as
racial preferences in America may already tend to aggravate racial ill
will.
Moreover, systematic class preferences on campus would create pressures
to dilute academic standards, even if not to the same degree, or at least
not in quite the same way, as racial preferences. With academically
weaker students, classroom standards are almost inevitably lower. Class
preferences weaken the academic ethos—the commitment of the institution
and its faculty to academic seriousness—in more subtle ways as well.
Preferences, at a minimum, convey a message that academic standards are
not paramount for the college or university in question. Moreover,
maintaining rigorous standards would tend to mean that students admitted
with class preferences would cluster at the bottom of the class or fail
entirely. Faculty and administrators might find this an unattractive prospect,
even if not quite so unattractive as when the same thing happens with
racial preferences. Diluting standards here too would be an easy solution.
And students admitted with class preferences would have reason to band
together as a kind of “victim” group, if only to press for looser standards
under which they would not always tend to be at the bottom.
It is sometimes suggested that preferences do not really sacrifice
academic merit because applicants who are given a preference—whether
on account of race or class—have more potential than their academic
qualifications suggest: social deprivation accounts for their lower entering
grades and test scores, and given a chance in college or in graduate
school, they will do better than predicted. Would that it were so. Studies of
minority students show that they do not perform better; if anything they
perform somewhat less well than their qualifications would predict.
Minority students, that is, receive grades in college or in graduate school
that are no better than their entering credentials would predict; in fact
their grades after admission are slightly worse on average than those
received by nonminority students with the same entering grades and test

31. See, e.g., Associated Press, 6 Students Commit Suicide To Protest Indian Jobs
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1990, at A14.
32. See SOWELL, supra note 29, at 23–28.
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scores.33 The “validity” of the SAT, especially when combined with
high school grades—the correlation between SAT scores and high
school grades on the one hand and subsequent college grades on the
other—is strong, both for minority and nonminority students.34 There is
no evidence that tests like the SAT, or equivalent tests for graduate and
professional schools, underpredict the academic performance of lowerclass applicants any more than they do for minority students. Richard
Kahlenberg, perhaps the leading advocate of class preferences, concedes
that there could be only “a very minor” class preference if the preference
were merely designed to correct, as he puts it, “the degree (if at all)” that
entering academic credentials fail to predict the academic success of
underprivileged students.35 In short, preferring academically weaker
university applicants because of their class backgrounds would mean
academically weaker university students.
The extent to which class preferences would compromise academic
quality depends in part on the scale of the preferences. Are there minimum
credentials below which no one would be admitted, and if so, how low
or high is the minimum for disadvantaged applicants? How large a
boost would there be for being disadvantaged? What proportion of the
entering class will be admitted with a preference: that is, how many
disadvantaged students will be admitted who would not have been
admitted on their merits? Once a formal program of class preferences
gets under way, it is unlikely that it would be restricted to a small number of
the “most disadvantaged.” There are proportionally few children of
radically disadvantaged homes who could qualify, even by very relaxed
preferential standards, for admission to elite or near-elite universities or
graduate schools. Moreover, if the most disadvantaged are admitted on
a lower standard but there is no academic concession for the next most
disadvantaged, then the most disadvantaged are apt to be admitted at the
expense of the somewhat disadvantaged: at the expense of applicants
33. ROBERT KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELITES 161 (1985); see also WILLIAM G. BOWEN &
DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING
RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 88 (1998) (“At almost every college in
our sample, black students are not only performing less well academically than whites but
also performing below the levels predicted by their SAT scores.”).
34. See WAYNE J. CAMARA & GARY ECHTERNACHT, THE COLL. BD., THE SAT® I
AND HIGH SCHOOL GRADES: UTILITY IN PREDICTING SUCCESS IN COLLEGE 9 (2000),
available at http://research.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/publications/2012/7/
researchnote-2000-10-sat-high-school-grades-predicting-success.pdf.
35. KAHLENBERG, supra note 6, at 149.
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whose qualifications are somewhat lower, on average, than those of
“privileged” applicants but who are receiving no preference.
To avoid the apparent injustice of any such “cutoff” in preferences,
there would be great pressure to have a sliding scale of preferences for
degrees of disadvantage. Moreover, preferences might seem more palatable
politically if they were available to a broader range of applicants: the
bottom half of the socioeconomic ladder, say, rather than the bottom ten
percent. After all, an argument can be made that the “injuries of class”
affect all families below the median, not just the poorest in society.36
Indeed, ninety percent of Americans are not in the country’s top ten
percent. In practice, the very poorest would mostly not be qualified on
any standard, so that a viable program of class preferences in higher
education would mean preferences for the more moderately disadvantaged,
a larger class of beneficiaries. Accordingly, when UCLA School of Law
adopted a class preference policy shortly after Proposition 209 went into
effect in California in the late 1990s, more than half the law school class
was admitted with such preferences.37 Richard Kahlenberg, too, advocates
a preference for any applicant below the socioeconomic median: the
median of the institution’s applicants, in fact, not the national median.
He would therefore give class preferences to solidly middle class
applicants, especially at elite universities where the average applicant is
well off. 38
The effect on academic standards might therefore be substantial.
Preferences mean admitting academically weaker students. Racial
preferences have some natural limit: the proportion of preferentially
admitted minority students is unlikely to be greater, roughly, than the
size of the minority in society. Class preferences have no such natural
limit. If a university admits half or more of its students on a lower
academic standard because of their “class origins,” the academic life of
that university will almost inevitably suffer, relative to what it would
have been with students admitted on their academic merits.
Racial and ethnic affirmative action is already strongly institutionalized on
many campuses, at least where laws like California’s Proposition 209 do

36. See ROBERT HICKEY ET AL., CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY & CTR. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD
TECH., LOSING GROUND: THE STRUGGLE OF MODERATE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS TO AFFORD
THE RISING COSTS OF HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION 10–12 (2012), available at http://
www.nhc.org/media/files/LosingGround_10_2012.pdf.
37. Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47
J. LEGAL EDUC. 472, 472, 486 (1997).
38. KAHLENBERG, supra note 6, at 142 (arguing for preferences for those below the
socioeconomic median “in the applicant pool”).
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not limit it.39 Class preferences are sometimes presented as an alternative
to racial preferences. Richard Kahlenberg urges straightforwardly that class
preferences should substitute for racial ones, both on the moral ground
that preferences should be directed to the disadvantaged and on the
prudential ground that class preferences would be politically and legally
more palatable than racial ones.40 Carol Swain and other advocates of
class-based affirmative action have taken much the same view.41
Supporters of racial affirmative action, however, respond that class
preferences are no substitute: most of America’s “disadvantaged” are not
minority, and if class preferences replace racial ones, black applicants in
particular will fare much worse than they do when there are implicit or
explicit numerical “goals”—and preferential standards—based on race.
There ought to be class preferences in addition to the racial ones, not
instead of them, insist many defenders of affirmative action, including
William Bowen, coauthor with Derek Bok of The Shape of the River, a
standard text in support of affirmative action.42
Class preferences, in fact, would probably reinforce racial preferences
rather than replace them in most states. After all, there is stronger moral
and historical justification for affirmative action by race than by class. It
is one thing to adhere to a principle that colleges and universities should
judge on the academic merits, that preferential treatment is corrosive and
wrong. But once it is conceded that class preferences are desirable, it
would be difficult or impossible to resist the claims that racial affirmative
action should continue as well, wherever it is permitted by law. America’s
racial history gives these claims special resonance, and there is wellorganized support for the existing preferences, especially on campus.
Any systematic program of preference tends to erode the principle of
making academic judgments on an academic basis. If higher education
is to have preferential treatment by social class, it will probably be in
39. See Affirmative Action: State Action, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/affirmative-action-state-action.aspx (identifying
states that have approved affirmative action measures).
40. KAHLENBERG, supra note 6, at 29, 86.
41. See generally CAROL M. SWAIN, THE NEW WHITE NATIONALISM IN AMERICA:
ITS CHALLENGE TO INTEGRATION (2002); RACE VERSUS CLASS: THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION DEBATE (Carol M. Swain ed., 1996) (discussing various aspects of the affirmative
action controversy and urging the benefits of class-based preferences).
42. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 33, at 50–51; see also WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL.,
EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 183–86 (2005) (concluding
that class-based preferences are not suitable substitutes for race-based affirmative action).
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addition to the already institutionalized racial and ethnic affirmative
action programs, not as a substitute for them.
III. CLASS PREFERENCES AND OPEN BORDERS
Preferential treatment for college and university applicants from “less
privileged” families would raise an obvious question of social fairness:
What about immigrants and their children?
As of 2009, approximately 39 million people living in the United
States were foreign-born, just over 12% of the population.43 Of these 39
million, just under 17 million, roughly 43%, are naturalized American
citizens. 44 As many as 11 million are estimated to be “unauthorized
residents” illegally present in the United States.45
In states such as California, New York, Texas, and Florida, where over
half the foreign-born live, there is a high concentration of immigrant
families.46 In 2009, more than one in four Californians were foreign-born,
and in New York and New Jersey, the statistic was more than one in
five.47 There are growing numbers of immigrants in other regions of the
country as well. The foreign-born population increased by over 150% in
Georgia, Tennessee, and Wyoming from 2000 to 2007, and the numbers
of the foreign-born more than doubled in six other states during the same
period.48
The levels of education and income among the foreign-born are rather
polarized. Nearly 29% of the foreign-born over twenty-five years of age
never completed high school, compared with just 8% of native-born
Americans; yet the percentage of the foreign-born with advanced graduate
degrees is equal to that of native-born Americans at 11%.49 The median
annual earnings of the foreign-born are 66% of the earnings of natives,
and noncitizens’ earnings are lower still, while 19% of foreign-born workers
earned less than $22,000 in 2009, compared with 14% of natives.50
The foreign-born are significantly more likely to be poor than the
native-born. Nearly 19% of the foreign-born lived in households with
43. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A DESCRIPTION OF THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION: AN
UPDATE 1 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/
121xx/doc12168/06-02-foreign-bornpopulation.pdf.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRANTS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2007: A PROFILE OF AMERICA’S FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION 7
(2007), available at http://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2007/back1007.pdf.
47. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 43, at 1.
48. CAMAROTA, supra note 46, at 9.
49. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 43, at 15.
50. Id. at 23, 25.
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income below the official poverty line in 2009, compared with 14% of
natives.51 Approximately 28% of natives and their children live in or
near poverty, while just over 43% of immigrants live in such households.52
Immigrants and their children, in short, make up a significant and
disproportionate share of the “underprivileged” in America, almost
regardless of how underprivileged is defined. In states like California
and New York, immigrants may be a third or more of the underprivileged.
This should not be surprising and has undoubtedly been true throughout
American history. Newcomers are obviously less apt to be “established”
than families long settled in this country. And although immigrants are
often ambitious people, they are typically without wealth or privilege:
Otherwise, why emigrate?
America has attracted immigrants since the nation became independent
and even before by offering something like equal opportunity. Not
perfect equality, to be sure: the foreign-born can never be the President
or the Vice President, and there have always been more workaday
handicaps as well. But America has traditionally offered immigrants a
fair chance to live and work, to be educated, and to compete and to succeed
economically, on substantially equal terms with natives. Americans
generally accept that this is fair, and immigrants have come willingly,
even eagerly, and in extraordinary numbers on these terms.
If the underprivileged are to receive preferential treatment for college
and university admissions and immigrants and their children are a
substantial fraction of the underprivileged, there will be acute questions
about who should receive these preferences.53 Affirmative action is
typically seen, at least in part, as a policy to compensate for past
injustices. Immigrants or their ancestors may have suffered injustice but
not in—or generally at the hands of—the United States. Throughout
American history, immigrants and their children assimilated, and in
many cases succeeded, without preferential treatment: indeed, in spite of
headwinds, because they often faced social barriers of various kinds.
Hence, American-born families might reasonably think it perverse now
to give preferential treatment to immigrants and their children: “Immigrants
51.
52.
53.

Id.
CAMAROTA, supra note 46, at 26.
See generally H UGH D AVIS G RAHAM , C OLLISION C OURSE : THE STRANGE
CONVERGENCE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AMERICA (2002)
(discussing the interaction of American immigration and affirmative action policies and
related issues).

455

come seeking equal treatment, and that’s fair enough. But why penalize
my children for the social capital our family has built up in America? If
my children earn better grades and scores, why should they be rejected
in favor of less qualified newcomers?”
In theory, various categories of people might be excluded from
preference, but such discrimination would not necessarily be very palatable
or even very practicable. Illegal immigrants would be obvious candidates
for ineligibility. But enforcement would require scrutiny, presumably by
college and university officials, of whether admissions applicants are
lawful residents. In many American cities, even the police are reluctant to
police compliance with the immigration laws.54 In California, the state
higher education law explicitly provides for illegal aliens who have
attended three years of high school in California to be treated as state
residents, who pay substantially less for public higher education than
“out-of-state” American citizens and legal residents.55 Eleven other
states make similar allowances for illegal aliens in higher education.56
Given such trends, it is difficult to imagine how universities could or would
identify illegal aliens and disqualify them from preferences for the
underprivileged. As for reserving class preferences exclusively for citizens
of the United States, discriminating between citizens and lawful residents
would seem even more invidious than discriminating against illegal aliens,
and discriminating against lawful residents would almost certainly violate a
variety of federal and state civil rights laws.57
54. Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1095–96 (2004) (noting the reluctance of many local police
departments to enforce immigration laws); see also Laura Parker, Police Departments
Balk at Idea of Becoming “Quasi-INS Agents,” USA TODAY, May 7, 2002, at 8a
(discussing local police forces’ hesitance to enforce federal immigration laws).
55. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2012) (stating that persons “without lawful
immigration status” are exempt from paying nonresident tuition at the California State
Universities and the California Community Colleges, so long as they meet the statute’s
residency and affidavit requirements). This statute, by charging higher tuition to out-ofstate U.S. citizens and legal residents than to illegal aliens in California, appears to flout
a federal law that prohibits states from providing “any postsecondary education benefit”
to “an alien who is not lawfully present . . . unless a citizen or national of the United
States is eligible for such a benefit.” Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 § 505, 8 U.S.C. § 1623 (2006). The California Supreme
Court nonetheless upheld the statute as constitutional in 2010. See Martinez v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 859–60 (Cal. 2010). However, similar cases are pending
in other state courts. See Denise Oas, Immigration and Higher Education: The Debate
over In-State Tuition, 79 UMKC L. REV. 877, 886–92 (2011); Ann Morse & Kerry
Birnbach, In-State Tuition and Unauthorized Immigrant Students, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13100.
56. Morse & Birnbach, supra note 55.
57. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of “national
origin” by public colleges, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a)(2) (2006), or by any program or
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Moreover, what about the children of the foreign-born? Proportionally to
their numbers, perhaps few illegal residents themselves seek higher
education, although some surely do. Among the foreign-born in general,
there are fewer young people of high school age—the age of the typical
college applicant—than among the native-born: only 7% of the foreignborn are under eighteen compared with 27% of the American-born.58
But children born in the United States, even to illegal aliens, are American
citizens.59 The birth rate, in fact, is higher among the foreign-born in
America than among natives.60 If there is to be preferential treatment for
the children of underprivileged homes, one or both parents in a substantial
fraction of such homes are apt to be immigrants, legal or otherwise.
Immigration policy is a volatile political topic in America today, as it
often has been in the past. Many Americans are inclined toward relatively
open borders and a welcoming attitude: “Send these, the homeless,
tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”61 But
opposition to immigration runs strong, especially when the numbers of
immigrants increase dramatically, as they have in recent decades.62 If
significant numbers of immigrants, or their children, are known to
activity receiving federal financial assistance, id. § 2000d. Although these provisions do
not refer explicitly to legal aliens, other federal statutes do, including the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (2006), which forbids employment
discrimination against legal aliens. In general, state government—which includes public
colleges and universities—may not discriminate against legal aliens except where
authorized or required by federal law. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377–80
(1971). Even the federal government may not discriminate invidiously against legal
aliens, although the courts are usually deferential to federal immigration and nationality
laws. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78–84 (1976); see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3339(a) (West 2012) (entitling aliens to all employment remedies under the state civil
rights laws).
58. ELIZABETH M. GRIECO ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 6 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2012pubs/acs-19.pdf.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
60. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 43, at 14 (explaining that, on average,
foreign-born women between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine had given birth to 2.6
children, compared with 2.0 children for U.S.-born women in that age group).
61. BETTE ROTH YOUNG, EMMA LAZARUS IN HER WORLD: LIFE AND LETTERS 3
(1995).
62. See Haya El Nasser & Kathy Kiely, Immigration Grows, Reaching Record
Numbers, USATODAY.COM (Dec. 12, 2005, 3:37 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/nation/2005-12-12-immigration_x.htm; US Census Data Reveals 16% Immigration
Increase in 5 Years, WORKPERMIT.COM (Aug. 17, 2006), http://www.workpermit.com/news/
2006_08_17/us/census_data_increase.htm.
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receive preferential treatment in college and university admissions on
grounds of being underprivileged, it is surely foreseeable that opposition
to immigration—and ill will toward immigrants—would be strengthened,
and a liberal public policy toward immigration would be less politically
viable than it is today.
IV. PREFERENCE FOR WHOM? THE ELUSIVE DEFINITION OF CLASS
If applicants of lower social class are to receive preference in college
and university admissions, social class will have to be defined in order to
decide who is eligible. Racial affirmative action confronts this problem
too, but in most cases there is broad agreement in America about who
meets the rough-and-ready standards of being white, African-American,
or Hispanic. About 2.9% of Americans identified themselves as multiracial
in the 2010 Census.63 The multiracial category is growing quickly, and
nearly 8% of married couples are now interracial;64 racial intermarriage
is growing especially quickly among better-educated Americans.65 But
more than 90% of whites and blacks still marry within their groups.66
Throughout American history, there have been individuals who have
“passed” as members of another race, but there are still relatively few
white college applicants who could plausibly claim to be black. Although
there may be more “borderline” cases of who is Hispanic, in the great
majority of cases—at least up to now—there is no dispute.
At first blush, it might be thought that social class could easily be
defined by family income: a college or university applicant would be
entitled to class preference if the applicant’s family income were below
a certain threshold. If a sliding scale were wanted, there might be a
greater preference—a more relaxed standard of admissions—the lower
63. KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 8 fig.2 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/
c2010br-02.pdf (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS REDISTRICTING DATE (PUBLIC
LAW 94-171) SUMMARY FILE 6-21 to 6-23 tbl.P1 (2011), available at https://www.census.
gov/prod/cen 2010/doc/pl94-171.pdf).
64. See Hope Yen, Interracial Marriage in the U.S. Climbs to New High, Study
Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2012, 7:13 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
02/16/interracial-marriage-in-us_n_1281229.html. But cf. Jamilah King, Census: Interracial
Marriage May Be on the Decline, C OLORLINES (May 26, 2010, 11:00 AM),
http://colorlines.com/archives/2010/05/census_interracial_marriage_may_be_on_the_decline.
html (noting that growth in the number of interracial marriages may be slowing).
65. See Interracial Marriage and Relationships: A Fact Sheet, NAT’L HEALTHY
MARRIAGE RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.healthymarriageinfo.org/download.
aspx?id=395.
66. Sharon M. Lee & Barry Edmonston, New Marriages, New Families: U.S.
Racial and Hispanic Intermarriage, 60 POPULATION BULL., June 2005, at 3, 12, available
at http://www.prb.org/pdf05/60.2NewMarriages.pdf.
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the income. But for various reasons, many of them cogent, supporters of
class preferences do not wish to define class simply and straightforwardly
by income.
For one thing, average cash incomes differ depending on geographic
location. A given income might seem “underprivileged” in an expensive
urban area, less so in a smaller city, and positively middle class in a rural
area. This would be an obvious problem for universities with applicants
from across America, but even for institutions drawing primarily from a
particular state, there are wide intrastate variations in the standards of
living that a given income might represent in different areas.
Average incomes also vary by age: most people’s income rises as they
get older, then falls when they retire.67 If class preferences were based
purely on parents’ income, applicants with younger parents would have
an arbitrary advantage over those whose parents are older and hence earning
more, regardless of anything else about the applicants’ family lives. By
the same token, if income were the only criterion, children whose parents
are retired would also tend to be preferred.
It is also quite possible to have a modest income but substantial capital. A
family living on the return from private capital might have the same
income as a working family, without being of the same social class by
any reasonable standard. Indeed, if college admission standards depended
on only income, it might be worthwhile for parents with private capital to
decrease their earnings deliberately, by shifting temporarily to investments
with lower yield but higher long-term gain.
There are also problems of disclosure and fraud, which may be
particularly acute if class is measured—and preference granted—on any
single criterion, such as income. For example, a family might fairly easily
defer or hide income, whereas the family’s social class, judged on a
wider array of criteria, would not at all correspond to the disclosed income.
In fact, it is a commonplace that money and social class are not
necessarily the same thing. In the 1930s, George Orwell wrote,

67. Income and Assets of the Elderly and Near Elderly, N AT ’ L BIPARTISAN
COMMISSION ON FUTURE MEDICARE, http://thomas.loc.gov/medicare/dowdal1.html (last
visited July 30, 2013) (“The youngest age group is just beginning their working years
and tend to have entry level jobs with low wages. Income increases as people gain
experience and some of those in the age group enter mid- and upper-level positions. In
the oldest age groups, income declines as people retire.”).
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[T]he essential point about the English class-system is that it is not entirely
explicable in terms of money. Roughly speaking it is a money-stratification,
but it is also interpenetrated by a sort of shadowy caste-system; rather like a
jerry-built modern bungalow haunted by medieval ghosts. . . . Probably there
are countries where you can predict a man’s opinions from his income, but it is
never quite safe to do so in England; you have always got to take his traditions
into consideration as well. A naval officer and his grocer very likely have the
same income, but they are not equivalent persons and they would only be on
the same side in very large issues such as a war or a general strike—possibly
not even then.68

The particulars of class differences in twenty-first-century America are
not what they were in Orwell’s England. But if class is a measure of
unearned hereditary advantage—or its absence—there probably has to
be more nuance about it than mere cash income. At a minimum, one
would want to take capital into account as well as income: savings,
investments, property holdings, trust funds, and so on.
More broadly, as Orwell suggests, money is only one element of
hereditary good or bad fortune. In America, as in every society, class is
a subtle and many-faceted—if not many-splendored—thing, which is
why it is so inexhaustible a topic in literature. A privileged or
underprivileged childhood might depend not only on one’s parents’
income and capital but also on their education and culture, their
occupational status, whether they were married and stayed married, what
sort of home and neighborhood one grew up in, and what sort of schools
one attended. And this is to consider only the more tangible, and hence
potentially measurable, elements of class; it leaves aside one’s parents’
values, styles, tastes, and connections, which might be important elements
too but which are scarcely quantifiable at all.
Colleges and universities that have experimented with class preferences
have actually considered some of the more tangible factors, and advocates
of class preference urge that they do so. UCLA School of Law, for
example, has questioned applicants about their fathers’ and mothers’
level of education, parents’ income and net worth, and the applicant’s
home address while in high school.69 No applicant was required to
answer these questions, but class preferences were only available to
those who did.70 In calculating preferences, the law school considered
the proportion of single-parent households in the applicant’s home
neighborhood; the proportion of families in the neighborhood receiving
welfare; and the proportion of young adults who had not graduated from

68.
69.
70.

460

GEORGE ORWELL, THE ROAD TO WIGAN PIER 154 (1937).
Sander, supra note 37, at 481–82, 483 tbl.2.
Id. at 481 & n.19.

[VOL. 50: 441, 2013]

A Class Act?
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

high school.71 Richard Kahlenberg urges that seven factors be taken into
account: parents’ education; parents’ income; parents’ net wealth; parents’
occupation; the family structure—including whether the parents were
married, whether they divorced, and mother’s age when the applicant
was born—the quality of the schools the applicant attended; and the
quality of the applicant’s neighborhood.72
The emphasis on home neighborhood as a criterion of class may be
motivated in part by the fact that blacks and Hispanics, in particular,
tend to live in neighborhoods that are “worse”—in terms of numbers of
single-parent households, families receiving welfare, and so forth—than
whites with similar incomes, and a desire on the part of the advocates and
designers of class preferences to include as many blacks and Hispanics
as possible among those who will benefit from the preferences.73
Deliberate racial gerrymandering of these criteria, to be sure, would violate
the provisions of laws that forbid racial preferences by state institutions
and authorities, like Proposition 209 in California.74
It will be noticed, of course, that there are a variety of criteria of class
here that might or might not be taken into account. UCLA School of
Law did not take account of parents’ occupation, family structure, or the
quality of the applicant’s secondary school, for example, although Richard
Kahlenberg urges that these should be considered. Some of the criteria
require further decisions about what should be considered: for example,
“family structure” might or might not include whether the applicant’s
parents were married and at what age, whether they divorced, whether a
single mother was divorced or instead had never married, and so forth.
Other criteria would also call for detailed judgment: for example, how to
rank parents’ occupation, how to rank the quality of an applicant’s
secondary school, and how to rank the quality of parents’ education—if
the status of the parents’ schools or colleges, for example, were to be
considered and not just how many years of schooling they had.
Choosing criteria of class, in short, entails a lot of discretion, far more
discretion than deciding who is eligible for racial preferences, at least so
long as most people’s racial identification is easily settled. Moreover,
there is further discretion in deciding how much weight to give each of
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 485 tbl.3.
KAHLENBERG, supra note 6, at 132–36.
RICHARD H. SANDER, FAIR HOUSING IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY: AN ASSESSMENT OF
PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES, 1970–1995, at 74 (1996).
74. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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the criteria once they are chosen. For example, to score an applicant’s
class, what relative importance should be given to parents’ income,
parents’ net wealth, parents’ education, the residential neighborhood,
and so forth? Class is a nebulous enough concept that there is no uniform
standard of how to define it, nor is it easy to imagine how there could be.
UCLA School of Law’s emphasis on residential neighborhood is
probably an example of choosing a criterion—and giving it a lot of
weight—in order to steer class preferences in a particular direction: in
this case, to racial minorities. If so, it may violate the provisions of
Proposition 209 in California. But other plausible criteria might be chosen,
or given more weight, if one wanted to favor rural applicants, labor union
families, Evangelicals, or other groups. Almost any change in the criteria,
or variation in how they are weighed, will change the profile of those
eligible for preferential treatment. Faculties and administrators could
adapt and change the criteria over time, depending on the results from a
particular formula. For example, there have not only been different
formulas for class preferences at different campuses of the University of
California but different formulas at various schools and programs on the
same campuses, and the formulas have also changed from year to year.75
It might be said that colleges and universities make discretionary
decisions all the time: about whom to hire as faculty, whom to admit as
students, what to teach, how to teach it, and so on. What is so special
about their defining social class and granting preferences accordingly?
But these other discretionary decisions are, at least in principle,
academic decisions decided on academic criteria. That colleges and
universities have academic expertise is—or at least has been—generally
accepted: hence the acceptance and respect accorded to academic degrees
conferred by these institutions. It is less obvious that academic institutions
have any particular expertise in social engineering or in deciding which
individuals or groups in society should receive preferential treatment on
grounds of class or hereditary disadvantage.
The discretion involved in defining class and disadvantage would be
open to political pressures of various kinds. Depending on what criteria
a college or university uses—and how it weights these criteria—different
racial and ethnic groups would receive greater or lesser preference, for
example. At state universities, which are controlled by the state legislatures,
well-organized ethnic groups would be in a position to lobby for criteria
that would favor them. Private universities receiving public funds would
be open to similar lobbying pressures, as well as to pressures from

75.
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private donors who might be interested in promoting the interests of one
or another group.
Deciding who is to receive how much preference would also be open
to ideological favoritism. This might simply take the form of ideological
preference for some minority groups over others. It might also take the
form of shading the criteria in order to give a boost to applicants with
particular political views. American colleges and universities are already
widely perceived to have become more politicized in recent decades.
Studies of university faculties and administrators reveal a heavy tilt to
the political left, very disproportionately to the country as a whole and
amounting to virtual unanimity on many campuses.76 Consciously or
otherwise, faculties and administrators might be inclined toward definitions
of class disadvantage that would maximize admissions preferences for
students with congenial political views—at the expense, for example, of
rural or Evangelical applicants whose views might, on average, be less
congenial.
Thus, when UCLA School of Law created a preference program based
on class, the school was evidently concerned that preferences should not
go to “highly talented applicants” with low family incomes who might
be the children of “highly educated missionaries.”77 This might reflect a
legitimate judgment that missionaries’ children are not unlucky by birth
or upbringing, but it might also reflect a degree of political or religious
prejudice. Along the same lines, Richard Kahlenberg, probably the most
widely read supporter of class preferences, explicitly sees preferences as
a step that will “help reforge the coalition required to sustain muchneeded social programs”—in other words, as a way to strengthen the
political left.78
In the absence of any uniform definition of class or of social disadvantage,
each college or university giving class preferences would be free—indeed,
obliged—to fix its own definition. Class preferences, accordingly, would
76. See Daniel B. Klein & Charlotta Stern, Political Diversity in Six Disciplines,
18 ACAD. QUESTIONS 40, 48 (2005) (noting voter registrations indicate as much as a 10:1
ratio of Democrats to Republicans among college and university faculty in humanities
and social science disciplines—“pretty much a one-party system”); see also John O.
McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political Contributions by Elite Law
School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1170 (2005) (showing that 80% or more of law
professors who contribute to political campaigns contribute wholly or mostly to
Democrats; the ratio is even more lopsided at many elite law schools).
77. Sander, supra note 37, at 473, 478.
78. KAHLENBERG, supra note 6, at 180.
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confer great power and discretion on the faculties and administrators
undertaking to bestow them. The decisions about preferential treatment
would not be made on academic criteria, which is where these institutions’
expertise is thought to be: preferences are avowedly a departure from
such criteria. Moreover, because colleges and universities are protective
of the confidentiality of their admissions decisions, the precise criteria of
class disadvantage—and especially the all-important weightings of these
criteria—would certainly not be made public. Indeed, no institution so far
that has adopted such preferences has revealed this information. Without
public transparency, such preferences would be open to political pressures
of various kinds. They would be open to ideological gerrymandering as
well. Perhaps class admissions preferences would be attractive if colleges
and universities were widely trusted to make nonacademic social policy
decisions and if preferential treatment were the only way to expand
educational opportunity. Neither is the case.
V. OPENING THE DOORS WITHOUT PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
In recent decades, economic barriers to educational opportunity have
grown in at least two ways. First, the cost of higher education has risen
sharply, both at private and at public institutions, far ahead of the rate of
inflation.79 Second, there has been a movement away from need-based
scholarships toward merit scholarships, regardless of need.80 Moreover,
reflecting federal aid policies, colleges and universities have moved away
from scholarship grants in general toward student loans; students relying
on “financial aid” must often incur very substantial debt.81
The movement away from need-based scholarships is easily explained.
Colleges and universities compete for the most highly qualified students.
Enrolling such students is an important factor in widely publicized rankings

79. Tuition at public and private colleges and universities rose at an average rate
of 5.6% per year beyond the rate of inflation from 2000 to 2010. See THE COLL. BD.,
TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2010, at 13 (2010), available at http://trends.collegeboard.org/
sites/default/files/CP_2010.pdf; see also Ronald G. Ehrenberg, The Economics of Tuition
and Fees in American Higher Education 5–6 (Cornell Univ. ILR Sch., Working Paper
No. 67, 2007), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1068&context=workingpapers (discussing the rise of tuition and fees in higher
education in comparison to inflation rates).
80. See Fay Vincent, No Merit in These Scholarships, POL’Y PERSP., June 2005, at
2, 2; see also Robert H. Frank, Intense Competition for Top Students Is Threatening
Financial Aid Based on Need, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2005, at C2 (discussing the shift
from need-based to merit-based financial aid).
81. See Lawrence E. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid Policy: A History and an
Assessment, FINANCING POSTSECONDARY EDUC.: FED. ROLE (Oct. 1995), http://www.ed.
gov/offices/OPE/PPI/FinPostSecEd/gladieux.html.
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of colleges and universities, such as in U.S. News & World Report,
which in turn affect the prestige and competitive standing of these
institutions. Many institutions therefore offer scholarship grants to
applicants with the very highest test scores and other credentials, regardless
of need, instead of directing their aid budgets toward other fully qualified,
but needier, applicants.82
The dramatic rise in tuition costs in recent decades is less easily
explained. Colleges and universities surely enjoyed a strong market
position, with higher education much in demand, especially given the
economic advantages of being a graduate. Various fixed costs to the
institutions may have risen during those years, perhaps faster than the
rate of inflation. But at many colleges and universities, it is also clear
that faculty salaries rose very generously in recent years, especially for
senior, tenured faculty. In a national survey of 115 colleges and universities,
including smaller colleges, full professors’ salaries now average over
$100,000 a year.83 At the more prestigious institutions and on the faculties
of professional schools, the average salaries for full professors are much
higher still. 84 At the same time, tenured professors’ teaching loads have
decreased, and the numbers of administrators and the quality of the
physical facilities have increased.
If the goal is to increase educational opportunity, a straightforward
way of doing it would be to ensure that scholarship aid is offered on the
basis of need—to applicants admitted on their merits—rather than to bid
for “star” students regardless of need. The academic cost to the college
or university of a need-based policy would be minimal, although it might
indeed preclude a certain amount of jockeying for position in the U.S.
News rankings.
More controversially, if higher education is to be more accessible to
poorer families, greater effort could be made to control costs. This
might mean some sacrifice by tenured professors by way of how much
their salaries rise or in terms of their teaching loads. It might mean
fewer academic administrators or less lavish buildings. But it would not

82. See Matthew Quirk, The Best Class Money Can Buy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Nov. 2005, at 128, 128 (noting “enrollment management” and the “cutthroat quest for
competitive advantage” among colleges and universities).
83. See Andrew Hacker, The Truth About the Colleges, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 3,
2005, at 51, 54.
84. See id.
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entail the compromise of academic quality and integrity that is inherent
in preferential lowering of standards based on students’ class origins.
Perhaps it is understandable that senior professors, including those
who express the most fervent commitment to educational equity, might
not wish to make any sacrifice in their salaries or teaching loads; that
institutions prefer to use scholarship grants to enhance their rankings
rather than to aid needy students; and that controlling costs is not a
priority when market forces do not compel it. Social class affirmative
action, by contrast, requires no sacrifices along these lines, whatever its
costs in academic integrity. Indeed, such affirmative action would only
increase the power and prerogatives of faculty and administrators,
deciding at their discretion who is to receive preferential treatment.
The mystique of affirmative action, moreover, is very strong among
academic faculty and administrators. With the passage of Proposition
209 in California and similar initiatives and laws elsewhere and with the
looming possibility prior to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Grutter v.
Bollinger—and again more recently while the Supreme Court considered
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin—that racial preferences might be
declared unconstitutional in public colleges and universities,85 class
affirmative action may have won academic adherents on the basis that
“we are committed to preferences, and if we can’t do it by race then let’s
do it by class.” The affirmative action outlook, by its very nature, tends
to be inimical to impartial academic standards and tends to view
preferential treatment, not as a last resort, but as something nearer to a
first resort.
There is surely good reason to be concerned about educational equity
in America and about making careers genuinely open to talent. Everyone
knows that life is not a level playing field. Accidents of birth and
upbringing differentiate people and their prospects in life, including their
educational prospects. There is an element of injustice, perhaps of tragedy,
certainly of inequality, in all this. But there are reasonable things that
can be done to mitigate educational inequality. If primary and secondary
public education were more academically rigorous, it would reduce the
competitive advantage of growing up in a cultured and well-read home.
More immediately, colleges and universities could choose to allocate
their scholarship budgets on the basis of need. And they could make
greater efforts to control their tuition costs.
Class preferences, by contrast, would tend to corrode the quality of
higher education, to introduce a new element of arbitrariness and unfairness,

85. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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and to mark a quantum jump in politicizing academic life in the United
States. In a world economy in which prosperity and growth depend
increasingly on education and knowledge and social mobility in turn
depends on prosperity and growth, burdening American higher education in
this way might threaten social mobility rather than promote it. Some
cures are worse than the disease. Perhaps class preference might be
justifiable as a last resort. There are many first resorts that ought to be
resorted to first.
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